Abbas and Haniya: Conflicting visions, approaches Haniya, L, and Abbas (Alarabiya.net graphic) Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and his sacked Prime Minister Ismail Haniya both cut their teeth in the politics of the armed struggle against Israel but a generation divides their approach to the Middle East conflict. The 71-year-old Abbas had already been involved in underground Palestinian politics for the best part of a decade when the 44-year-old Haniya was born. He co-founded the mainstream rebel faction Fatah with Yasser Arafat in the diaspora in Kuwait in the 1950s and was intimately involved in its armed resistance against Israel in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But as early as 1974 when Haniya was just 11, Abbas had already concluded that armed struggle was not an end in itself and that year he became the first senior Palestinian figure to hold talks with Israelis. Those early talks involved fringe left-wingers and peace activists but eventually paved the way for the secret talks masterminded by Abbas that led to the 1993 Oslo accords with Israel and the creation of the Palestinian Authority he now heads. It was only as a result of those agreements that Abbas was able to enter the Palestinian territories in 1994 after spending most of his life in exile. Born in Safed in British mandate Palestine in 1935, he had fled with his family when the historic center of Jewish learning was incorporated into the new state of Israel in 1948. Haniya by contrast was born and raised in the Palestinian territories in an impoverished Gaza refugee camp just kilometers (miles) from his family's ancestral home in the port of Ashkelon in what is now Israel. Educated at Gaza's Islamic University, he rapidly became involved in Islamist politics when the eruption of the first Palestinian uprising sparked the formation of Hamas in 1987. He was jailed several times by Israel before being deported to southern Lebanon with more than 400 fellow Islamists in December 1992. On his return he rose to prominence as the private secretary of Hamas's iconic wheelchair-bound spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and survived a 2003 assassination attempt against the Hamas founder before the Israeli military finally got their man the following year. After the assassination of both Yassin and his successor Abdelaziz Rantissi in retaliation for a wave of deadly suicide bombings by Hamas militants inside Israel, Haniya sided with those inside the movement calling for a rethink of its strategy. The father of 13 championed both the idea of a conditional truce with Israel and the strategy of using the movement's huge grass-roots base to enter mainstream electoral politics. The first bore fruit in early 2005. Since then Hamas has not carried out a single suicide bombing inside Israel, although it has fired dozens of rockets into the Jewish state from Gaza and also took part in deadly cross-border raid last year in which militants seized an Israeli soldier. The entry into electoral politics saw Hamas rout Abbas's long-dominant Fatah faction in January 2006 parliamentary elections that catapulted Haniya to the premiership. But the victory at the ballot box failed to win the Islamists the international respectability Haniya had hoped for. The European Union praised the conduct of the elections but joined Israel and the United States in maintaining its blacklisting of Hamas as a terrorist organization and suspended all aid to the Palestinian Authority when Haniya took power, crippling his administration. The election victory also forced Haniya into an uneasy sharing of power with Abbas, in which both men realized the key importance of control of the security forces. Abbas himself had had a near-career-breaking row with Arafat in 2003 when as prime minister he could not agree with his longtime mentor on the chain of command. Faced with the domination of the security forces by Abbas loyalists, Haniya's government set up its own interior ministry paramilitary force in defiance of the president, supplementing its substantial militia presence in its Gaza bastion. It was those forces that were ultimately able to overwhelm the official security forces in Gaza overnight, enabling Haniya to defy Abbas's decree ousting him and effectively creating two rival Palestinian administrations. (AFP) Doomsday cult and security clash in Iraq, 70 dead Nasrallah in public for first time since Israel war Yemen tracks killers of Belgian tourists Israel continues Gaza blitz despite UN concern Dutch govt ready for anger over anti-Islam film Comments 1 - ll easy [ Thursday, September 13, 2007 ] Hanyieh is controlled by Iran, just like hezbollah is. Their people is the last thing in their mind. Isreal made Hamas. Print Save Send [ Tuesday, 04 September 2007 ] [Analysis] Guillotining Gaza Noam Chomsky The death of a nation is a rare and sombre event. But the vision of a unified, independent Palestine threatens to be another casualty of a Hamas-Fatah civil war, stoked by Israel and its enabling ally the United States. Last month’s chaos may mark the beginning of the end of the Palestinian Authority. That might not be an altogether unfortunate development for Palestinians, given U.S.-Israeli programs of rendering it nothing more than a quisling regime to oversee these allies’ utter rejection of an independent state. The events in Gaza took place in a developing context. In January 2006, Palestinians voted in a carefully monitored election, pronounced to be free and fair by international observers, despite U.S.-Israeli efforts to swing the election towards their favorite, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party. But Hamas won a surprising victory. The punishment of Palestinians for the crime of voting the wrong way was severe. With U.S. backing, Israel stepped up its violence in Gaza, withheld funds it was legally obligated to transmit to the Palestinian Authority, tightened its siege and even cut off the flow of water to the arid Gaza Strip. The United States and Israel made sure that Hamas would not have a chance to govern. They rejected Hamas’s call for a long-term cease-fire to allow for negotiations on a two-state settlement, along the lines of an international consensus that Israel and United States have opposed, in virtual isolation, for more than 30 years, with rare and temporary departures. Meanwhile, Israel stepped up its programs of annexation, dismemberment and imprisonment of the shrinking Palestinian cantons in the West Bank, always with U.S. backing despite occasional minor complaints, accompanied by the wink of an eye and munificent funding. Powers-that-be have a standard operating procedure for overthrowing an unwanted government: Arm the military to prepare for a coup. Israel and its U.S. ally helped arm and train Fatah to win by force what it lost at the ballot box. The United States also encouraged Abbas to amass power in his own hands, appropriate behavior in the eyes of Bush administration advocates of presidential dictatorship. The strategy backfired. Despite the military aid, Fatah forces in Gaza were defeated last month in a vicious conflict, which many close observers describe as a pre-emptive strike targeting primarily the security forces of the brutal Fatah strongman Mohammed Dahlan. Israel and the United States quickly moved to turn the outcome to their benefit. They now have a pretext for tightening the stranglehold on the people of Gaza. ‘To persist with such an approach under present circumstances is indeed genocidal, and risks destroying an entire Palestinian community that is an integral part of an ethnic whole,’ writes international law scholar Richard Falk. This worst-case scenario may unfold unless Hamas meets the three conditions imposed by the ‘international community’ — a technical term referring to the U.S. government and whoever goes along with it. For Palestinians to be permitted to peek out of the walls of their Gaza dungeon, Hamas must recognize Israel, renounce violence and accept past agreements, in particular, the Road Map of the Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations). The hypocrisy is stunning. Obviously, the United States and Israel do not recognize Palestine or renounce violence. Nor do they accept past agreements. While Israel formally accepted the Road Map, it attached 14 reservations that eviscerate it. To take just the first, Israel demanded that for the process to commence and continue, the Palestinians must ensure full quiet, education for peace, cessation of incitement, dismantling of Hamas and other organizations, and other conditions; and even if they were to satisfy this virtually impossible demand, the Israeli cabinet proclaimed that ‘the Roadmap will not state that Israel must cease violence and incitement against the Palestinians.’ Israel’s rejection of the Road Map, with U.S. support, is unacceptable to the Western self- image, so it has been suppressed. The facts finally broke into the mainstream with Jimmy Carter’s book, ‘Palestine: Peace not Apartheid,’ which elicited a torrent of abuse and desperate efforts to discredit it. While now in a position to crush Gaza, Israel can also proceed, with U.S. backing, to implement its plans in the West Bank, expecting to have the tacit cooperation of Fatah leaders who will be rewarded for their capitulation. Among other steps, Israel began to release the funds — estimated at $600 million — that it had illegally frozen in reaction to the January 2006 election. Ex-prime minister Tony Blair is now to ride to the rescue. To Lebanese political analyst Rami Khouri, ‘appointing Tony Blair as special envoy for Arab-Israeli peace is something like appointing the Emperor Nero to be the chief fireman of Rome.’ Blair is the Quartet’s envoy only in name. The Bush administration made it clear at once that he is Washington’s envoy, with a very limited mandate. Secretary of State Rice (and President Bush) retain unilateral control over the important issues, while Blair would be permitted to deal only with problems of institution-building. As for the short-term future, the best case would be a two-state settlement, per the international consensus. That is still by no means impossible. It is supported by virtually the entire world, including the majority of the U.S. population. It has come rather close, once, during the last month of Bill Clinton’s presidency — the sole meaningful U.S. departure from extreme rejectionism during the past 30 years. In January 2001, the United States lent its support to the negotiations in Taba, Egypt, that nearly achieved such a settlement before they were called off by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In their final Press conference, the Taba negotiators expressed hope that if they had been permitted to continue their joint work, a settlement could have been reached. The years since have seen many horrors, but the possibility remains. As for the likeliest scenario, it looks unpleasantly close to the worst case, but human affairs are not predictable: Too much depends on will and choice. * Published in the UAE's KHALEEJ TIMES July 18, 2007. Noam Chomsky’s most recent book is ‘Interventions,’ a collection of his commentary pieces distributed by The New York Times Syndicate. Chomsky is emeritus professor of linguistics and philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass. [Analysis] Peace in Palestine requires involving all parties International Crisis Group Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and President Abbas’s dismissal of the national unity government and appointment of one led by Salam Fayyad amount to a watershed in the Palestinian national movement’s history. Some paint a positive picture, seeing the new government as one with which Israel can make peace. They hope that, with progress in the West Bank, stagnation in Gaza and growing pressure from ordinary Palestinians, a discredited Hamas will be forced out or forced to surrender. They are mistaken. The Ramallah-based government is adopting overdue decisions to reorganize security forces and control armed militants; Israel has reciprocated in some ways; and Hamas is struggling with its victory. But as long as the Palestinian schism endures, progress is on shaky ground. Security and a credible peace process depend on minimal intra-Palestinian consensus. Isolating Hamas strengthens its more radical wing and more radical Palestinian forces. The appointment of Tony Blair as new Quartet Special Envoy, the scheduled international meeting and reported Israeli-Palestinian talks on political issues are reasons for limited optimism. But a new Fatah- Hamas power-sharing arrangement is a prerequisite for a sustainable peace. If and when it happens the rest of the world must do what it should have before: accept it. The events in Gaza have given rise to wholly conflicting accounts. For Fatah and those close to Abbas, they were a murderous, illegitimate coup that exposed the Islamists’ true face. The plan, they say, was premeditated and carried out with Iranian backing. They claim to have video proof of a Hamas-led plot to assassinate Abbas. Hamas, too, denounces an attempted coup, though one planned by Fatah elements determined to rob the Islamists of their electoral victory and overturn the Mecca Agreement between the two rival organizations. They say those elements were fostering lawlessness in the Gaza Strip and that the U.S., Israel and several Arab countries conspired to isolate Hamas as well as arm and train forces loyal to Fatah strongman Muhammad Dahlan in anticipation of a showdown. Hamas’s actions, they insist, were preemptive. There is truth to both accounts. Evidence and eye- witness stories collected by Crisis Group suggest Hamas’s armed forces – the Executive Security Force and the Qassam Brigades – were strengthening their arsenal and taking steps in preparation for a fight. Their brutality and disregard for human life at the height of the confrontation also is beyond doubt. But Fatah cannot escape blame. From the moment the Mecca Agreement was signed, several of its officials and presidential advisers undercut it. They urged European governments to neither end their boycott of Hamas nor too closely embrace the unity government. Security plans in Gaza understandably could be read by the Islamists as attempts to bolster a force intended to confront them. The Mecca Agreement’s collapse reflected conflicting domestic agendas: Fatah’s inability to come to terms with the loss of hegemony over the political system coupled with Hamas’s inability to come to terms with the limitations of its own power. But it would be disingenuous in the extreme to minimize the role of outside players, the U.S. and the European Union in particular. By refusing to deal with the national unity government and only selectively engaging some of its non-Hamas members, by maintaining economic sanctions and providing security assistance to one of the parties in order to outmaneuver the other, they contributed mightily to the outcome they now publicly lament. Through their words and deeds, they helped persuade important Fatah elements that the unity government was a transient phenomenon and that their former control of the Palestinian Authority (PA) could be restored. And they helped convince important Hamas elements that the unity government was a trap, that time was not on their side and they should act before their adversaries became too strong. The crisis was not produced by the Mecca Agreement but rather by deliberate and systematic attempts to undermine it. Recent events present a mixed picture. In Gaza, Hamas has made undeniable strides in restoring order. Alan Johnston, the kidnapped British journalist, was released, and Gazans testify to feeling more secure than in a long time. But the Islamists’ takeover of virtually all PA institutions, the curtailment of basic freedoms and harassment of Fatah members bode ill. Nor has Hamas found a way to cope with the closing of vital crossing points, the sharp drop in trade and the accelerating humanitarian crisis. In the West Bank, too, there are signs of progress, including steps to reorganize the security sector, the infusion of international funds, renewed Israeli- Palestinian cooperation and talk of political negotiations. There is also a darker side, however, including the suspension of basic laws, separation between Gaza and the West Bank and revival of obsolete Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) institutions at the expense of elected PA bodies such as the parliament. The basic question, to which neither Palestinians nor the international community has responded, is whether it is possible to ensure security and move toward a two-state settlement with a politically and geographically divided Palestinian polity. Paradoxically, the more successful the strategy of strengthening Abbas, the greater Hamas’s motivation to sabotage it. Progress thus would create its own threats. If past is prologue, putting Hamas under pressure without giving it a reasonable alternative would lead it to escalate violence against Israel in the expectation that renewed confrontation would embarrass Abbas, torpedo diplomatic progress and alter intra- Palestinian dynamics. How can Abbas deliver a ceasefire without the Islamists and their allies? How can he legitimize a political agreement with Israel – which must entail difficult and unpopular concessions – if Hamas’s significant constituency feels excluded? How can he move toward building a state if Gaza is left out? A more promising course would be for Fatah and Hamas to immediately cease hostile action against each other and begin to reverse steps that are entrenching separation between Gaza and the West Bank and undermining democratic institutions. In the longer run, they should seek a new power- sharing arrangement, including: - a clearer political platform, explicitly endorsing the Arab Peace Initiative; - a commitment to a reciprocal and comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire; - reform of the security services, to include de- fictionalization and integration of Hamas’s Executive Security Force; - reform of the PLO, expanding it to include Hamas and Islamic Jihad; - formation of a new unified government approved by the parliament; and - consideration of early presidential and legislative elections, although not before one year before the establishment of new government. To facilitate this, Arab states and other third parties should offer their mediation and monitoring of any agreement. If an agreement is reached, the Quartet should be prepared to engage with a new government politically and economically. Under current circumstances and given outside interference from various parties, reconciliation is hard to contemplate. Fatah must accept a truly pluralistic system. Hamas owes the Palestinian people answers as to its ultimate political goals and how it wants the national movement to achieve them. Israel must internalize the need to bring the occupation to an end. The international community must accept the right of Palestinians to select their own leaders. Ultimately, a stable Palestinian consensus and the Islamists’ inclusion in the political system are vital to any peace process. That was Abbas’s original intuition. It led to the January 2006 elections and then to Mecca. The parties’ understandable current anger notwithstanding, it remains the right one. * This analysis is the executive summary of a report entitled, "After Gaza," released by the International Crisis Group in August 2007. The full text can be found in English and Arabic at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4975 70 dead as Iraqi forces defeat doomsday cult Nasrallah in public for first time since Israel war Yemen tracks killers of Belgian tourists Israel continues Gaza blitz despite UN concern Dutch govt ready for anger over anti-Islam film Comments Leave a Comment [Facts] Players after the Hamas takeover Abbas, Rice and Olmert from L to R (File) HAMAS Hamas was created in 1987 at the start of the first Palestinian uprising by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin of the Muslim Brotherhood's Gaza wing. The group's supporters carried out suicide bombings in Israel during the 1990s and early 2000s before agreeing a conditional truce with Israel in 2005. Hamas was elected as the government of the Palestinian people in January 2006. The Islamist group took over the Gaza Strip by force in June 2007 after Fatah refused to hand over control. Hamas is branded as a terrorist organization by the US, EU, Israel and other international countries. FATAH Fatah was founded by Palestinian President Abbas and Yasser Arafat in the diaspora in Kuwait in the 1950s and fought an armed struggle against Israeli occupation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Its leadership only returned to the Palestinian territories after Arafat signed the 1993 Oslo Accords recognizing Israel. Arafat led the party until his death in 2004, while Abbas was elected President in 2005. In the January 2006 parliamentary election, the party lost its majority to Hamas, assuming the role of main opposition. PALESTINIAN PRESIDENT MAHMOUD ABBAS Abbas dismissed a Hamas-led national unity government on June 14 and formed an emergency cabinet in the Israeli-occupied West Bank after Hamas seized control of Gaza following a week of fighting with forces loyal to Abbas's secular Fatah movement. Abbas accused Hamas of trying to assassinate him, launched a crackdown against the Islamist group in the West Bank, and issued emergency decrees to consolidate his control. Some of those decrees have drawn fire from lawyers who drafted the interim constitution. ABBAS'S PRIME MINISTER SALAM FAYYAD Abbas appointed Fayyad, a Western-backed, U.S.- trained economist, as prime minister of his new government rejected by Hamas. Fayyad has promised to crack down on militants but has said success depends on Israel stopping pursuing the gunmen. DISMISSED PRIME MINISTER ISMAIL HANIYA Hamas's Gaza leader Haniya still considers himself prime minister, but faces the problem of running an aid-dependent enclave cut off economically and diplomatically -- not only from Israel and major Western and Arab powers, but also from the West Bank. Haniya and exiled Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal have called for renewed dialogue with Fatah. Israel and Western powers have shunned Hamas. ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER EHUD OLMERT Olmert cautiously welcomed the new administration, ending a freeze on transfers of funds imposed last year after Hamas won a parliamentary election and formed a government. He balked at removing major West Bank checkpoints and roadblocks to help Abbas's administration, but is handing over in stages hundreds of millions of dollars in frozen tax funds and has freed 250 Fatah prisoners. U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE CONDOLEEZZA RICE Rice backed Abbas's decision to install Fayyad. Washington wants to create momentum towards statehood in the hope of bolstering Abbas and Fatah and undercutting support for Hamas. Washington has discussed with Western diplomats the possibility of Palestinian elections by mid- 2008. MIDDLE EAST ENVOY TONY BLAIR The former British prime minister visited the West Bank and Israel in July for the first time as the new envoy for the Quartet of Middle East mediators -- the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations. He is tasked with helping to create a stable Palestinian government and promoting economic development, but reportedly wants to extend his work to restarting peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians. 70 dead as Iraqi forces defeat doomsday cult Nasrallah in public for first time since Israel war Yemen tracks killers of Belgian tourists Israel continues Gaza blitz despite UN concern Dutch govt ready for anger over anti-Islam film Comments [Voices] People caught in the crossfire Here is what some Palestinians are saying about their internal divisions: - "What happened in Gaza has destroyed our hopes and inspirations for statehood forever," said Khadija Hamed, a 52-year-old housewife from the West Bank town of Qalqilya. - "Now there is a wound that cannot be healed. What happened in Gaza has put the state project in a coffin before its birth. Both Fatah and Hamas are responsible for what has happened. I do not trust any of them," said Mohammad Abu al-Hassan, a merchant from the West Bank town of Jenin. - "The Palestinians will wait another 100 years and maybe future generations will learn from the mistakes of Fatah and Hamas. Both should step down. It has become evident that they are only after their factional interests," said Abdel-Qader Said, 38, a teacher from Jenin, in the West Bank. - "Having two entities, one ruling in Gaza and the other ruling the West Bank undermines the Palestinian cause. There is a lost people, without a leadership," said Palestinian political analyst Hani al-Masri. - "We have blurred vision in terms of identifying our goal. A year ago, the goal was to end the occupation. Now I do not know. The power struggle will continue for a long time," said Ahmad al- Khatib, a 32-year-old government employee from Ramallah, in the West Bank. - "If we had a vision to establish a state in the coming 20 years, the events in Gaza have added another 20 years, and perhaps more," said Salwa al- Hureimi, a women's rights activist from the West Bank town of Bethlehem. - "The situation will never be stable with Hamas alone or with Fatah alone. Gaza cannot be separated from the West Bank. The biggest sin is to divide the homeland," said Hisham Abu Ali, 21, a university student in Gaza. - "I did not expect brothers to kill brothers. We, as Palestinians, are lost and Israel is the sole winner," said Rula Dannoun, a Bethlehem housewife. - "We are heading towards the unknown," said Ibrahim Toma, a bank employee from Bethlehem [Facts] Life in the Gaza Strip Hamas's violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in June created two separate Palestinian administrations whose schism is likely to persist for some time. LIFE IN GAZA: * Gaza is an arid rectangle of territory at the southeast end of the Mediterranean, wedged between Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. It is tiny -- about 45 km (25 miles) long and 10 km (6 miles) wide. * About 1.5 million Palestinians live in Gaza, more than half of them refugees from past wars with Israel and their descendants. Gaza has one of the world's highest population densities and demographic growth rates. * Most Gazans live on less than $2 a day. Unemployment stood at 35 percent in 2006, according to the World Bank. Israeli security closures curbing cross-border trade and access to jobs and Western sanctions imposed after Hamas came to power in early 2006 have hit the Palestinian economy hard. * Concrete slums, facades covered by murals of Palestinian militants killed by Israel, sprawl across sand dunes dotted by palm groves. HISTORY OF THE TERRITORY: * Gaza has been continuously inhabited for more than 3,000 years. It was a crossroads of ancient civilizations and a strategic outpost on the Mediterranean. It is believed to be the burial place of the Prophet Mohammad's grandfather. * The Ottoman Empire ruled Gaza for hundreds of years until World War One, when it came under British rule along with the rest of Palestine. It came under Egyptian control in 1948 during the Arab-Israeli war that led to Israel's creation. * Gaza's population tripled in 1948-49 when it absorbed about a quarter of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees fleeing areas now part of Israel. * Israel captured Gaza from Egypt in the 1967 war and ended its military presence there in September 2005, having removed 8,500 Jewish settlers from 21 enclaves and demolished their homes after almost four decades of occupation. * Israel resumed ground operations in June 2006 after militants from Gaza tunneled across the border and seized an Israeli soldier, who is still being held. More recently Israel has killed dozens of Palestinians in Gaza since mid-May. Gaza militants have fired over 220 rockets into Israel in the same period. * Hamas was elected to power in January 2006, and took over the Gaza Strip by force in June 2007 after Fatah refused to hand over control. In June 2007, Abbas dismissed Haniya's government, and formed an emergency cabinet – actions Hamas declared as illegal and unconstitutional. Haniya exercises de facto authority in Gaza, while Fayyad's authority is limited to the West Bank